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Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next 




The Wall Street Journal recently reported that 2006 saw the concept of 
shareholder democracy return “with a vengeance.”2  The most talked about 
development was the push to allow shareholders to directly nominate candidates 
for the board of directors.3  Increased shareholder power was also seen in the 
reinvigoration and success of shareholder proposals since the corporate scandals 
of Enron, WorldCom, and others in 2001-2002.4 For example, proposals on board 
declassification have received such strong support from shareholders5 that the 
CEO of proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) now advises 
corporations not to even attempt to fight these proposals.6 
Not only are shareholders’ uses of their powers generally expanding, but 
their concept of what is a legitimate corporate governance issue is also expanding. 
Although still subject to much debate and controversy, governance no longer only 
includes traditional issues of CEO compensation, board structure, and anti-
                                                 
2 Henry G. Manne, The ‘Corporate Democracy’ Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., January 2, 2007, at A23. 
3 In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that American International Group (AIG) 
must include in its proxy materials a shareholder proposal sponsored by the pension plan of 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) that—if supported 
by a majority of shareholder votes—would allow shareholders to directly nominate candidates for 
the board of directors in some circumstances. AFSCME v. AIG, 2006 WL 2557941. In 2003, the 
SEC sought public comment on proposed changes to the proxy rules related to shareholder 
nominated directors. This proposal became the subject of significant debate in the academic legal 
community. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk., The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 
BUS. LAWYER 53 (2003); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests In the 
Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003). As of this 
writing, the SEC has not announced its final position with respect to AFSCME v. AIG. 
4 Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2006, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 
ADVISOR 1, 7-8 (2006) 
5 Proposals on board declassification have averaged over 60% of the vote in 2004 to 2006. Joan 
Warner, Get Ready for a Red-Hot Season, DIRECTORSHIP, December 2006/January 2007, at 1, 4. 
6 Joan Warner, supra note 5, at 26. Likewise, the last two years have seen a dramatic increase in 
the number of proposals filed on majority elections for directors and the number of votes they 
have received. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2006 POST SEASON REPORT 3-4 (2006), 
available at www.issproxy.com/pdf/2006PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf. Although only a small 
minority of corporations currently uses majority voting, some expect it to become the norm within 
a few years. Joan Warner, supra note 5, at 26.  
Public Pensions & LTRI                                        
 
 3
takeover devices, but also includes so-called non-financial criteria, 7 or in other 
words, sustainability.8 Thus, for many investors, governance issues are 
transforming into “Environmental, Social, and Governance” (ESG) issues. The 
basis of the ESG movement is less about the values investing commonly 
associated with the socially responsible investing (SRI) funds, and more about 
long-term value investing focused on reduced risk and improved shareholder 
value.9  
Just as 2006 may be seen as a breakout year for corporate governance 
activism, it was also the year for ESG issues. Shareholders sponsoring proposals 
on social and environmental issues enjoyed their most successful year to-date.10 
This success coincided with the increased visibility of the importance of non-
financial matters to some shareholders. For example, in April 2006, United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan unveiled the Principles for Responsible 
                                                 
7 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2006 GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION TO BUSINESS IMPERATIVE  58-59 
(2006) , available at http://www.issproxy.com/globalinvestorstudy/index.jsp. 
8 See Stuart L. Hart and Mark B. Milstein, Creating Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 
56, 56 (2003) (“A sustainable enterprise is one that contributes to sustainable development by 
delivering simultaneously economic, social, and environmental benefits.”)  
9 See THE GLOBAL COMPACT, WHO CARES WHO WINS: CONNECTING FINANCIAL MARKETS TO A 
CHANGING WORLD i (2004), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/financial_markets/who_cares_who_wins.pdf (stating that 
corporations with better performance on ESG issues can “increase shareholder value by, for 
example, properly managing risks, anticipating regulatory action or accessing new markets, while 
at the same time contributing to the sustainable development of the societies in which they 
operate. Moreover, these issues can have a strong impact on reputation and brands, an increasingly 
important part of company value.”);  ONVALUES INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH LTD., 
CONFERENCE REPORT: INVESTING FOR LONG-TERM VALUE: INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, 
SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE VALUE DRIVERS IN ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESEARCH 2 
(2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/financial_markets/zurich_rep.pdf 
(reporting the outcomes from a conference attended by members of various major financial 
institutions and finding that “There was a remarkable degree of agreement among participants that 
ESG factors play an important role in the context of longer-term investment strategies and that the 
financial industry must improve their consideration in research and investment processes.”). With 
respect to risk, some point out that many of the “really big discontinuous shifts in share price” are 
due to issues related to a firm’s social performance. Raj Thamotheram, A Critical Perspective on 
Activism: Views From a Pension Professional, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 295, 299 (Rory 
Sullivan and Craig Mackensie, eds., 2006). For a framework for understanding the tensions 
between short-term results and long-term growth and how managers must stop viewing 
sustainability as a “one-dimensional nuisance” but as a “multidimensional  opportunity,” see 
generally Hart & Milstein, supra note 8.  
10 Barry B. Burr, Social, Green Proposals Feel the Love, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 16, 
2006, at 8.  
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Investment by ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange.11 These 
principles require investors to consider ESG issues in their investment analysis 
and decision-making, to be active owners—including voting on proposals and 
engaging with corporations—and to press for consideration of ESG issues 
throughout the financial industry.12 For others, the increased profile of climate 
change issues has also increased its importance to investors.13 
Also in 2006, both the Conference Board and the Business Roundtable’s 
Institute for Corporate Ethics issued reports detailing the harms of the stock 
market’s short-term focus and urging that action be taken to refocus corporations 
on the long-term.14 Krehmeyer and colleagues define short-termism as an 
“excessive focus of some corporate leaders, investors, and analysts on short-term, 
quarterly earnings and a lack of attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and 
conventional approaches to long-term value creation.” 15 Although commentators 
have discussed the problem of short-termism since the early 1980s, the issue is 
receiving priority again due to the scandals of 2001-2002 showing its harmful 
effects and, more importantly for purposes of this article, the greater recognition 
given to the potential positive impact of ESG factors on long-term performance.16 
In other words, sustainable economic development is receiving greater 
recognition as an issue of long-term shareholder value.17 These issues come 
together under the term “long-term responsible investing” (LTRI).18 
                                                 
11 UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, available at 
www.unpri.org/principles. 
12 Id. 
13 Charles J. Bennett, Risk and Opportunity in the Gathering Climate Change Storm, CONFERENCE 
BOARD EXECUTIVE ACTION REPORT, No. 228, February 2007, at 2 (noting the increased 
“frequency, pace, and profile” of climate change-related actions coming from the media, 
governments (state, local and national), the scientific community, financial institutions, and 
corporations).  
14 MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM, Conference Board Research 
Report (2006); DEAN KREHMEYER ET AL., BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, ASSET MANAGERS, INVESTORS, AND 
ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE, available at www.darden.edu/corporate-
ethics/pdf/Short-termism_Report.pdf. 
15 Krehmeyer et al., supra note 14, at 3. 
16 Tonello, supra note 14, at 5 & 9. 
17 See Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes website, Sustainability Investment, available at 
http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/06_htmle/sustainability/sustinvestment.html (“the concept 
of corporate sustainability is attractive to investors because it aims to increase long-term 
shareholder value.”) 
18 See Raj Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 296 (utilizing the LTRI term); Danyelle Guyatt, Meeting 
objectives and resisting conventions: A focus on institutional investors and long-term responsible 
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Heavily involved in all of these developments are public pension funds. 
These state and local government pensions collectively control approximately 10 
percent of the US equity market.19 Many legal scholars envisioned a positive role 
for these institutional investors as monitors of corporate management and 
encouraged reforms to strengthen their “shareholder voice.”20 Public pensions 
were singled out for this role due to their lack of a commercial relationship with 
corporate management that could create a conflict of interest,21 and later for their 
long-term, economy-wide interests.22 Some commentators cited public pensions 
for the recent success of social and environmental proposals.23 Others, however, 
are leery of granting these institutional investors additional power. These critics 
argue that public pension funds will use any increased powers to take actions 
based on the private interests of politicians or special interest groups and not 
based on serving the best interests of the corporation and other shareholders.24 
Likewise, Delaware Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. argues that individual 
                                                                                                                                     
investing, 5 CORP. GOV.: AN INTL. J. OF BUS. & SOCIETY 139. 139 & 147n.1 (2005) (adopting the 
LTRI term).There are a wide variety of terms used to describe the use of environmental and social 
factors in investment decision making, including socially responsible investing, ethical investing, 
non-financial investment criteria, enterprise risk considerations, SEE (social, environmental and 
ethics factors), and others. Charles J. Bennett et al., Expanding the Investment Frontier: Factoring 
Environmental, Social and Governance Criteria into Investment Analysis, CONFERENCE BOARD 
RESEARCH REPORT 31 (2005). The LTRI term seems to best capture the investment interests of 
public pension funds. Alternatively, the term “sustainable development investing” (SDI) also 
serves this purpose.  
19 CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2005 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 27 (2005). In 2003, public 
pension funds controlled $2.2 trillion in assets, including $1.3 trillion in equity. Id. at 9, 15.  
20 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 813, 886 (1992). The debate over the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance developed significant attention in the early 1990s when these institutions started 
gaining a significant hold over the US equity market. Collectively, institutional investors 
(including mutual funds, insurance companies, private pensions, and foundations) owned 41% of 
the US equity market in 1990. Conference Board, supra note 19, at 29. By 2003, institutions 
owned 59% of the total market and 69% of the largest 1,000 US corporations. Id. at 29 & 34. 
21 John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1367-68 (1991). 
22 JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC (2001) 
[hereinafter Hawley & Williams, Fiduciary Capitalism] 
23 Burr, supra note 10, at 8. 
24 See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 3, at 78-79; Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund 
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 795 (1993); see 
also infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
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investors are lamenting that corporations are becoming “a therapy couch for 
politically-motivated institutional investors to vent their causes of the moment.”25 
This article brings together these developments in shareholder activism 
and the “next frontier” of corporate governance26—that is, the environmental and 
social aspects of the expanded definition of corporate governance—to explore the 
role of public pensions under a “new governance” regulatory approach focused on 
sustainable economic development. As recognized over 30 years ago by 
Christopher Stone,27 traditional legal mechanisms have significant limits in 
regulating corporate behavior related to environmental and social performance. 28 
In response, there is a movement towards utilizing more decentralized regulatory 
mechanisms that are part of a “new governance” approach.29 These changes are 
most pronounced in environmental regulation, where regulators recognize the 
limits of command-and-control regulation and seek to utilize flexible, innovative 
approaches.30 In this article, I argue that public pension funds—even with the 
criticisms leveled at them mentioned briefly earlier—have the potential to serve a 
valuable role in this new regulatory approach.  
This article proceeds by describing new governance regulation, including 
why such an approach is necessary for sustainable economic development issues, 
and then discussing a role for public pensions under such an approach. The next 
part takes a look what public pensions are currently doing in the area of LTRI. I 
find that although some funds are making progress, overall their actions are 
limited and may actually be contributing to the short-termism problem. The 
following part proposes that public pensions should be required to disclose how, 
if at all, they incorporate LTRI issues into their investment policy and how that 
                                                 
25 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuck’s 
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1766 (2006). Commentators 
often combine union and public pensions together when raising these criticisms. In this paper, 
however, I focus only on public pensions. With respect to the shareholder activism of union 
pension funds, see generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998); Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Lab or Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 
WASH. L. REV. 41 (1998); 
26 Institutional Shareholder Services, 2006 Investor Study, supra note 7, at 58 (asking if corporate 
social responsibility is the “next frontier” of corporate governance for investors). 
27 CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR (1975) 
28 See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
30 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Default Rules in Private and Public Law: Extending Default Rules 
Beyond Purely Economic Relationships: Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 861, 861-63 (2006) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Default Rules] 
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policy is implemented. This proposal is based on a UK law that went into effect in 
2000. This part also considers the response of UK pensions to that requirement 
and discusses the expected benefits of such a law in the US. In addition, I discuss 
what other pension fund governance reforms may be necessary to ensure the 
success of the law.  
2 New Governance Regulation and Long-Term Responsible Investment 
The regulatory goal that I address in this paper is to ensure that 
corporations are focused on long-term value creation through sustainable 
economic development. At a general level, this is not a controversial goal. For 
example, Delaware Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr states that elected government 
officials of both parties and “most individual investors”: 
. . . do not see corporations as having solely the social purpose of 
benefiting investors as investors. Rather, they understand and 
embrace the historical reality that the corporate form was 
authorized as an instrumental means of enhancing the well-being 
of our society as a whole and not simply as a means to make 
investors rich and immune from liability for corporate acts. 
Although many traditionalist policymakers would concede that 
making managers more directly accountable to stockholders is a 
useful means to achieve the larger objective of increasing societal 
wealth, they do not conflate the goal of a durably wealthier society 
with the short-term interests of investors in higher stock prices. 
Indeed, they are concerned that tilting the direction of corporate 
policy toward short-term thinking is counterproductive, not simply 
for investors but for other important constituencies such as 
employees and communities.31   
With respect to the failures of long-term value, Tonello states that an 
“excessive focus on quarterly results, scarce attention to value-creation strategies, 
and failure to probe deeply enough into long-term performance are believed to be 
                                                 
31 Strine, supra note 25, at 1769. Strine goes on to state “Existing American corporate law bears 
out the popularity of these traditionalist views. Most U.S. states permit corporate directors to 
consider the interests of constituencies other than stockholders. Even Delaware law has long made 
clear that directors have wide leeway to pursue the course of action they believe in good faith to be 
in the longterm best interests of stockholders, even if that means forsaking other tactics that might 
increase stock value in the short term.” (footnotes omitted). Id. While commenting that it is 
uncontroversial to state that regulatory policy should ensure a focus on the long-term, SEC 
Chairman William H. Donaldson stated “I realize that speaking out on the need for a longer-term 
approach to investment analysis is akin to speaking out in favor of baseball, hot dogs, and apple 
pie – it’s something (almost) everyone supports, in an abstract way.” William H. Donaldson, 
Speech by SEC Chairman: 2005 CFA Institute Annual Conference, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050805whd.htm. 
Public Pensions & LTRI                                        
 
 8
leading to a kind of ‘short-termism’ which damages market credibility and 
depresses today’s economic development.”32 A clear example of this problem 
comes from a recent survey of over 300 public corporation financial executives 
that found that 80 percent of these respondents would decrease discretionary 
spending in such areas as research-and-development and plant maintenance in 
order to meet quarterly earnings targets.33 The researchers also found that 
managers would often reject positive net present value projects if it meant missing 
their earnings targets for the current quarter.34  
This short-termism not only leads to scandals such as Enron,35 but also 
causes unsustainable economic development.36 Sustainable development is 
commonly defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”37 Rather 
than seeking to halt development, sustainable development recognizes that 
economic growth is necessary to meet the “needs and aspirations” of the present, 
as well as future generations.38 However, principles of equity and environmental 
protection must guide that development.39  
                                                 
32 Tonello, supra note 14, at 5. 
33 John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. OF 
ACCOUNTING AND ECON. 3, 32-35 (2005). These researchers believe that these percentages are 
likely lower than actual practice, as respondents may be unwilling to admit such actions even in a 
survey. Id. at 36. Interviews conducted by the researchers confirmed these findings, with one 
manager admitting that their firm would needlessly terminate company-trained employees to meet 
earnings targets. Id. at 68-69. 
34 Id. at 37-39. 
35 See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Lessons from Enron, How did Corporate and Securities 
Law Fail? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 1189 (2003). 
36 For example, although there may be general support amongst investment professionals for the 
belief that proactive management of social and environmental risks has a material impact on long-
term market value, there is not support for the belief that management of such risks will have a 
material impact on short-term market value. Rory Sullivan et al., Does a Focus on Social, Ethical 
and Environmental Issues Enhance Investment Performance, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 56, 58 
(Rory Sullivan and Craig Mackensie, eds., 2006). Thus, excessive focus on the short-term causes 
limited consideration of these issues. 
37 WORLD COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). For a 
review of how academics and practitioners have attempted to define the term “sustainable 
development” and a discussion of the values and principles behind the term, see generally Robert 
W. Kates et al., What is Sustainable Development?, ENVIRONMENT, April 2005, at 8 
38 WORLD COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 37, at 40; see also Robert C. 
Paehlke, Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: CHALLENGES, 
CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES (Robert F. Durant et al., eds) 29, 60 (2004). (stating—in reference 
to constraints on economic growth from a sustainability perspective—that “limits and restraint 
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Some corporations are attempting to put these principles of economic 
prosperity, environmental integrity, and social equity, into action through value 
creation, environmental management, and corporate social responsibility.40 
External pressures, such as the short-term pressures from investors and analysts, 
may impede these corporations efforts to implement those principles. Some 
investors, however, do not see environmental management and corporate social 
responsibility as being in conflict with long-term value creation, but as necessary 
components of it.41 These beliefs are bolstered by research showing that there is a 
positive relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate 
financial performance (CFP).42  Investing on such beliefs is distinct from an 
investment approach that incorporates ESG issues into investment decision 
making based on moral judgment of a corporation’s actions.43 Indeed, there is 
uncertainty in what to name this movement of incorporating extra-financial 
factors into investment analysis, which I refer to here as LTRI.44 It is clear that 
“ethical” investing45 and even the term socially responsible investing (SRI) brings 
                                                                                                                                     
may be the wrong terms here: it is better perhaps to speak of a growing need for energy-, 
materials-, and land-use efficiency. In the long term, sustainability is preferable not only socially 
and environmentally, but economically as well.”) 
39 WORLD COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 37, at 40; Kates et al., supra note 
37, at 11. 
40 Pratima Bansal, Evolving Sustainably: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Sustainable 
Development, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 198-200 (2005). 
41 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
42 For reviews, see Jośe Allouche  & Patrice Laroche, A meta-analytical examination of the link 
between corporate social and financial performance, 57 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE GESTION DES 
RESSOURCES HUMAINES 18, 33 (stating that their meta-analysis results “show conclusively that 
CSP has a positive impact on corporate financial performance”) (2005);  Marc Orlitzky et al., 
Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUDIES 403, 427 (2003) 
(presenting results of a meta-analysis of 52 studies and finding that corporate social performance 
and corporate financial performance have a bi-directional, positive relationship); Joshua D. 
Margolis and James P. Walsh, Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business, 
48 Admin. Sci. Q. 268, 274 (2003) (reviewing over 100 studies on the CSP-CFP link and finding 
that almost half show a positive relationship when CSP is an independent variable, only a handful 
show a negative relationship, and the remainder have a no significant results or a mixed results). 
43 See infra note 87 and accompanying text (distinguishing long-term investing and universal 
ownership from some forms of socially responsible investing). 
44 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
45 In general, there seems to be a trend away from using the word “ethical”, as was used in the 
acronym SEE (social, ethical and environmental). See Jill Francis Solomon & Aris Solomon, 
Private Social, Ethical, and Environmental Disclosure, 19 ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & 
ACCOUNTABILITY J. 564, 583 (2006) (providing quotations from investment professionals that 
“ethical” is inappropriate terminology in investing because we can all disagree on what is “ethical” 
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up negative connotations.  As an example, the executive director of one large 
public pension fund informed me that the SRI term “terrifies” the fund’s trustees, 
but the trustees are apparently comfortable with many of the ideas behind SRI, as 
they approve initiatives on sustainability and governance that avoid the use of that 
term.46 What “terrifies” those trustees, seems to horrify those that critique this 
movement. 
 Many argue that corporate management should follow only the basic 
mandates of the law and they should not cede to the demands of investor groups 
that pressure companies to exceed the basic requirements of the law, as that would 
be engaging in inappropriate political action.47 This argument, however, 
inappropriately assumes two things. First, it assumes that the investors applying 
the pressure are acting from self-interested political beliefs rather than a belief 
that higher social and environmental performance will improve long-run 
performance. Second, it assumes that the law is an effective and efficient 
regulator of corporate behavior related to sustainable development. In this paper, I 
focus on the latter false assumption as motivation for my proposal, but the 
implementation of that proposal draws on the first.  
Traditional legal mechanisms48 have significant limits when attempting to 
regulate the issues that relate to a firm’s environmental and social performance. 
Although traditional regulation has clearly improved corporate behavior, it has 
reached its limits in many ways.49 These failings have been well-documented 
elsewhere and include arguments of inefficiency, over-regulation, normative 
legitimacy, delay in responding to new harms or changing societal expectations, 
enforcement issues, and being limited to focusing on compliance with minimum 
standards rather than encouraging corporations to seek higher standards that are 
within their capabilities and resource constraints.50 Overall, traditional regulation 
                                                                                                                                     
and “Well you see you are OK if you stay with a phrase like “Socially responsible” and never 
introduce the word “ethics”!”).  
46 Executive director response to a pension fund survey described infra Part III.2. 
47 The classic statement of the position comes from Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 3, 1970, at 32; see also Profit and the 
Public Good, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005. 
48 Traditional legal mechanisms refer to command-and-control regulation or “first generation” 
regulation. See Karkkainen, Default Rules, supra note 30, at 861-62. 
49 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives from Law and 
Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 442 (1999) (“Most observers would agree that we are 
at a point of diminishing returns; whatever we have achieved so far with the current model of 
environmental regulation, we will achieve less for the level of effort expended from here 
forward.”) 
50 An early, and well-known, critique of the limits of traditional legal mechanisms is found in 
Stone, supra note 27, at 93-110. For reviews of these criticisms, see David Hess, Corporate Social 
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simply encourages compliance with set standards of acceptable behavior, which 
has a tendency to push corporations to “leav[e] rationality, innovativeness, and 
societal interests behind.”51 
Due to these limitations, regulators have sought out new regulatory 
approaches to complement traditional legal approaches. This movement away 
from command-and-control regulation and towards a “second generation” 
approach has been gaining significant momentum in environmental regulation,52 
as well as in such areas as occupational health and safety,53 food safety,54 and 
employment discrimination.55 In general, this second generation approach may be 
referred to as “new governance” regulation.56  As the name suggests, when 
applied to corporations, new governance regulation focuses less on directly 
regulating corporate behavior—such as through traditional command-and-control 
models—and more on influencing the governance of corporations. Although new 
governance scholarship is not based in a single socio-legal theory, Lobel has 
identified commonalities in implementation. First, this approach is participatory 
                                                                                                                                     
Responsibility and the Law, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (JOSÉ ALLOUCHE, ED.)154, 
158-63 (2006); CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 8-12 (2002); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental 
Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 460-66 (1996) (arguing 
that environmental regulation suffers from “three major structural defects: fragmentation by 
medium, statutory overregulation, and agency confrontation”); Karkkainen, Default Rules, supra 
note 30, at 862 (arguing that environmental regulation is “often costly to implement, inflexible, 
insensitive to local variations in the economic costs and environmental benefits associated with 
achieving a specified level of environmental performance, and, in some circumstances, they may 
stifle innovation”). 
51 Wade-Benzoni et al., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based Negotiations: The Role of 
Values and Institutions, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 41, 48 (2002). For an empirical study supporting 
this statement, see Tenbrunsel et al., Understanding the Influence of Environmental Standards on 
Judgments and Choices, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 854 (2000). 
52 Robert F. Durant et al., Introduction in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: 
CHALLENGES, CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 1 (Robert F. Durant et al., eds., 2004). 
53 Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace 
Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) 
54 Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 691 (2003) 
55 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475–76 (2001) 
56.See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: 
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (2004); Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (providing an overview and synthesis of the work in 
this area). 
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in that there is a role for all sectors of society (state, market, and civil) at all stages 
of regulation, from the development of standards to enforcement.57 Multiple 
actors are encouraged to work together to identify common values and goals, and 
seek consensus rather than focus on “a winner-takes-all approach.”58 Following 
from this participatory approach, new governance regulation is decentralized, 
which promotes experimentation and utilization of local knowledge.59 This also 
permits meaningful deliberation between the interested actors60 and encourages a 
system that is continually updated based on new knowledge.61 Finally, these 
regulatory initiatives may cut across multiple policy domains.62 
A general category of a new governance approach directed towards 
investors (and others) for the purpose of improving corporate sustainability is the 
disclosure of information related a firm’s performance on environmental and 
social issues.63 One such example is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.64 The TRI requires 
companies in certain industries to publicly disclose their plants’ emissions of 
listed pollutants.65 A second example is sustainability reporting. These are annual 
reports published by corporations and available to the public that disclose 
information on the firm’s entire economic, environmental, and social 
performance. In contrast to the TRI, sustainability reporting is voluntary in the 
United States.66 In addition, the information reported is not standardized and is 
                                                 
57 Lobel, supra note 56, at 371-76 
58 Id. at 376-79. Negotiated rulemaking is an example of an attempt to achieve collaboration. Id. at 
377. 
59 Id. at 381-383. 
60 Id. at 384. 
61 Id. at 395-400.  
62 Id. at 385-87.  
63 See, e.g., Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy and International Labor Standards, 16 
GOVERNANCE 51 (2003); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate 
Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227 (1995); see also Lobel, supra note 56, at 371-76. 
64 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT OF 1986, §§ 301-330, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).  
65 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT OF 1986, §313, 42 U.S.C. § 
11023 (1994). 
66 France is the first country to require corporations to disclose a comprehensive social report. For 
a critique and France’s law, see Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and 
France's Nouvelles Regulations Economiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 441 (2004). 
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often qualitative.67 The primary attempt to develop standards for these reports is 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),68 whose standards are used by over 1,000 
organizations worldwide.69  
For both the TRI and the sustainability reporting, a key goal of the 
regulation is to make information available to other actors for their use in the 
marketplace or the political arena.70 For example, there is evidence that 
corporations that are comparatively high polluters based on their disclosed TRI 
data suffer significant stock market declines.71 With this new information on a 
firm’s environmental performance, investors reacted negatively based on the 
belief that the data indicated operational inefficiencies, poor management at the 
firm, or that the disclosure itself will negatively impact the corporation’s 
reputation or lead to tighter environmental regulation.72 For other actors, such as 
local interest groups, the TRI data is just one more piece of information to use in 
their interactions with corporations over the corporation’s complex “license to 
operate.”73  
Overall, through mandatory disclosure of information related to a firm’s 
environmental performance, the TRI seeks to achieve new governance goals by 
empowering the corporation’s stakeholders (e.g., community members, 
consumers, investors) to pressure and work with corporations in an attempt to find 
workable solutions based on each corporation’s specific situation and on current 
knowledge. Under this system, the government’s role is limited to developing and 
                                                 
67 For a critique of social reporting in the United States, see generally David Hess & Thomas W. 
Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting: Is a Standard of Optimal Truthful 
Disclosure a Solution? 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 5 (2007). 
68 Global Reporting Initiative, www.globalreporting.org. 
69 GRI Press Release, available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NewsEventsPress/PressResources/PressReleasesG3Release.htm 
70 See Mark Stephan, Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, But Why? 83 
SOCIAL SCIENCE Q. 190 (2002). 
71 See Swaminathan G. Badrinath and Paul J. Bolster, The Role of Market Forces in EPA 
Enforcement Activity, 10 J. OF REGULATORY ECON. 165 (1996); James Hamilton, Pollution as 
News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. OF ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT 98 (1995); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxic Release Information: A Policy Tool for 
Environmental Protection, 36 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 243 (1998); Shameek Konar, and 
Mark A. Cohen. Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on 
Toxic Emissions, 32 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 109 (1997). 
72 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89 GEORGETOWN L. J. 257 (2001). 
73 Neil Gunningham, et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go 
Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 307, 328-29 (2004) 
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enforcing the requirements of disclosure and not in directly regulating the 
environmental performance of corporations. 
These information-based regulations do have significant limitations. 
Commentators have labeled the TRI as “moderately effective”74 because the TRI 
data fail to capture a firm’s total, current environmental performance, including 
the nature of the environmental and health hazards caused by the listed 
pollutants.75 Beyond anecdotal evidence, sustainability reporting has yet to have 
any demonstrated impact on corporate social performance due to such factors as it 
being a voluntary program without standardized indicators for reporting.76 
Overall, these deficiencies have made sustainability reports of limited use to 
investors.77 
Both of these programs—and new governance approaches in general78—
rely on the involvement of third parties for their success. These potential third 
parties include non-governmental organizations (public interest groups), 
consumers, commercial partners, financial institutions (e.g., banks and insurance 
companies), consultants, and institutional investors.79 As Gunningham and 
colleagues warn, however, drawing in third parties to assist as surrogate 
regulators “is a process with many pitfalls and, unless skillfully done, can result in 
negative rather than positive effects.”80 In this article, I limit my focus to only the 
potential role of the institutional investor category of public pension funds for 
improving the environmental and social performance of corporations in a manner 
that is more effective, efficient, legitimate, and flexible, than the alternative of 
continually expanding traditional regulatory methods. Pension funds fit into the 
new governance model by directly impacting corporations through their 
investment decisions and engagement, and to the extent these actions improve 
corporate disclosure, they advance the general effectiveness of disclosure-based 
policies, such as voluntary sustainability reporting. 
                                                 
74 David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. OF POLICY 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 170-72 (2006). 
75 For a review of criticisms of the TRI, see Karkkainen, Information as Regulation, supra note 72; 
Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Environmental Right-to-Know, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 805. 
76 For a review of the accounting literature analyzing sustainability reporting, see Hess & Dunfee, 
supra note 67, at 7-10. 
77 See Solomon & Solomon, supra note 45, at 573-75. 
78 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing the participatory and collaborate 
nature of new governance approaches). 
79 See Neil Gunningham et al., Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: Achieving 
Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 BUS. STRATEGY & ENVIRONMENT 211, 212-219 
(1999) (discussing the potential role for each of these groups). 
80 Id. at 212. 
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2.1 Why Harness Public Pension Funds as Surrogate Regulators?81 
Public pension funds are a key institutional investor category in 
discussions related to LTRI issues for several reasons. First, they lack a conflict of 
interest with corporations that other institutional investors may have, such as 
managers of corporate pension funds.82 This independence makes public pension 
funds more likely to challenge management on controversial issues. Second, these 
pension funds are investing to provide retirement benefits for current and future 
government employees. Thus, they have a strong interest in the long-term return 
on their investments. Third, due to the increasing size of some of these funds—as 
of September 2005 there were over 50 public pensions holding over $10 billion in 
assets83—and the fact that their holdings often cover the entire market, some refer 
to large public pensions as “universal owners,” which means that the economy-
wide issues of the nation and the portfolio-wide issues of the pension fund are 
essentially the same.84 Thus, whereas managers may not support spending on 
workforce education or protection of the environment due to the limited direct 
benefits to their companies, some public pensions will directly capture those 
benefits to the economy from the increased positive externalities of education and 
the reduced negative externalities from environmental protection.85  
Although the long-term investing and universal ownership aspects of 
public pensions have placed them in alignment socially responsible investors 
(SRI) in some situations, there are significant differences. First, not all universal 
owner concerns even overlap with long-term investing concerns. For example, 
although the economy-wide concerns of a universal owner would be appropriate 
for a fund with indexed investments representing a large share of the market, 
those concerns are not necessarily appropriate for a long-term investor without 
such indexed holdings.86 Second, long-term investors and universal owners 
                                                 
81 The title of this subsection is based on Gunningham et al, supra note 79. 
82 Coffee, supra note 21, at 1367-68. 
83 Based on data from Pensions & Investments’ website, available at 
www.pionline.com/page.cms?pageId=624. 
84 James P. Hawley & Andrew T. Williams, The Emergence of Universal Owners: Some 
Implications of Institutional Equity Ownership, CHALLENGE, July-August 2000, at 43, 45 & 54. In 
addition, the use of an indexing strategy, or large ownership positions that prevent selling a 
company’s shares without a negative impact, push firms to exercise voice rather than use an exit 
strategy. Id. at 45. 
85 Id. at 47-49. 
86 HERMES INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LTD., HERMES’ RESPONSE TO THE MARATHON CLUB’S 
DISCUSSION PAPER – “LONG-TERM, LONG-ONLY INVESTING” 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.hermes.co.uk/pdf/corporate_governance/commentary/commentary_06/Marathon_LTL
O_Hermes_response_300606.pdf, 
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concerns do not overlap with those social investors making decisions based solely 
on their views of the morality of a corporation’s practices or products.87  
The concerns of long-term investors and universal owners do overlap, 
however, with those SRI investors that believe that these so-called extra-financial 
issues reduce risk and produce greater returns over the long-term. This form of 
social investing has evolved from the use of negative screens (e.g., refusing to 
invest in tobacco companies), to positive screens (e.g., investing in a company 
because of its positive environmental performance), to engagement with the 
company. Shareholder engagement with the company—directly or indirectly—is 
the main role envisioned for public pension funds under this new governance 
model. As explained further below, it is expected that public pensions’ greatest 
impact will be indirect. Rather than directly engaging with a significant number of 
corporations, public pensions will have an impact by influencing the engagement 
practices of their money managers. In addition, any actions they take that 
influence the production of sustainable investing research and corporate 
disclosures will benefit other potential actors in the financial and consumer 
markets, as well as in the political arena.  
3 Public Pension Funds and LTRI: Evaluation of Current Practices 
Public pensions are active in LTRI issues in several different ways. First, 
several public pension funds are currently active in filing shareholder proposals 
on social and environmental issues (which includes negotiations with corporations 
to seek an agreement that causes the filer to withdraw the proposal). The most 
active are the five New York City retirement funds that act collectively through 
the City Comptroller, who votes proxies on behalf of the funds and directs their 
shareholder initiatives.88 In 2005 and 2006, the New York City funds filed social 
and environmental proposals at over 70 corporations.89 These proposals covered 
                                                 
87 For example, Christian Brothers Investment Services controls over $4 billion in investments for 
Catholic institutions and invests based on the guidelines established by the United State 
Conference for Catholic Bishops. CHRISTIAN BROTHERS INVESTMENT SERVICES WEBSITE, SRI 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT, available at www.cbisonline.com/page.asp?id=160. The guidelines 
require the “refusal to invest in companies whose products and/or policies are counter to the 
values of Catholic moral teaching or statements adopted by the Conference of bishops”; which, for 
example, includes refusal to invest “in companies that manufacture contraceptives or derive a 
significant portion of its revenues from the sale of contraceptives, even if they do not manufacture 
them.” UNITED STATES CONFERENCE FOR CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PRINCIPLES FOR USCCB 
INVESTMENTS, Principle III.A. available at www.usccb.org/finance/srig.shtml; UNITED STATES 
CONFERENCE FOR CATHOLIC BISHOPS, USCCB INVESTMENT POLICIES, POLICY I.B. available at 
www.usccb.org/finance/srig.shtml. 
88 New York City Comptroller, Bureau of Asset Management Website, available at 
www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam. 
89 The 2005 Proxy Initiatives of the New York City Pension Funds 1, available at 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/corp_gover_pdf/2005-shareholder-report.pdf; The 
Public Pensions & LTRI                                        
 
 17
such issues as the McBride Principles,90 sexual orientation anti-bias policies, 
sustainability reports, and international labor standards.91 Other pension funds 
were significantly less active. The Minnesota State Board of Investments filed 
proposals on drug re-importing at four different pharmaceutical companies in 
each 2005 and 2006.92 The New York State Comptroller, on behalf of the state 
common retirement fund, co-sponsored six proposals in 2006 on topics such as 
greenhouse gases and employment discrimination.93 In addition, the Connecticut 
Retirement Plans and Trust Fund has filed proposals related to disclose of climate 
change risk and international labor.94 
Second, pension funds are active through collaborative shareholder groups 
to push for changes at corporations without filing shareholder proposals and to 
lobby for regulatory changes. Several public pension funds—CalPERS, CalSTRS, 
Connecticut Retirement, New York City Employees, New York City Teachers, 
and New York State Common—belong to the Carbon Disclosure Project.95 This is 
an international group of institutional investors that make an annual request for 
greenhouse gas emissions disclosure from the largest corporations worldwide.96 
Other pensions are involved in more focused projects such as the Ohio Public 
Employees Retirement System’s involvement in a project on the long-term 
profitability of the pharmaceutical industry.97 State treasurers or comptrollers 
                                                                                                                                     
2006 Proxy Initiatives of the New York City Pension Funds 2-3, available at 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/corp_gover_pdf/2006-shareholder-report.pdf. 
90 See infra note 123 and accompanying text (providing a brief description of the principles). 
91 2005 Proxy Initiatives of New York City, supra note 89, at 3-5. 
92 Based on data contained in Checklist of 2005 Shareholder Proposals, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
ISSUES REPORTER, June/July 2005, at 17-24; and Checklist of 2006 Shareholder Proposals, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL ISSUES REPORTER, June/July 2006, at 19-24.  Under current SEC rulings, 
those companies may now properly exclude those proposals from the proxy materials. ISS, SEC 
Staff Issue First Decisions of 2007 Proxy Season, CORPORATE SOCIAL ISSUES REPORTER, Feb. 
2007, at 12, 12 -13. 
93   NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT 68 (2006) 
94 CERES, Press Release: Investors Win Agreement From Ford Motor Co. To Prepare Climate 
Risk Report, March 31 2005, available at http://www.ceres.org/news/news_item.php?nid=93; Dan 
Haar, State Treasurer is Reform Activist, HARTFORD CURRENT, January 24, 2005. 
95 Carbon Disclosure Project website, Signatories, available at 
www.cdproject.net/cdp4signatories.asp. In addition to these pension funds, the state treasurers of 
California, Maine, Maryland, Oregon, North Carolina and Vermont, are also members. Id. 
96 Carbon Disclosure Project website, About Us, available at www.cdproject.net/aboutus.asp 
97 Phrama Futures website, About Pharma Futures, available at 
http://www.pharmafutures.org/beta/about/. The pharmaceutical industry’s long-term profitability 
is stated as being important to “Pension funds who have a long-term sector exposure and 
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from nine different states (including California, Connecticut, and New York) 
signed a letter through CERES demanding that the SEC do more with respect to 
corporate disclosures related to climate change.98  The same pension members of 
the Carbon Disclosure Project—with the exception of CalSTRS and the addition 
of the Illinois State Board of Investment—belong to the United Nation’s 
Principles of Responsible Investment.99 Finally, seven state treasurers, CalPERS, 
CalSTRS, and the Illinois State Board of Investment have signed an “investor 
action plan” on climate change supported by the Investor Network on Climate 
Risk.100 
Third, some pension funds are directly involved in social and 
environmental issues through their investments. CalPERS has an environmental 
investments initiative which includes various projects on screening firms for 
environmental performance and investing in environmentally friendly 
technologies.101 In addition, CalPERS restricts or prohibits investments in 
countries with poor records on issues such as financial transparency, political 
stability, and labor practices.102 CalSTRS recently joined the Enhanced Analytics 
Initiative, which seeks to improve analyst research on LTRI issues.103 Many other 
pensions have negative screens on their investments, but, as discussed further 
below, those appear to be on a limited number of issues and do little to further the 
                                                                                                                                     
particularly those whose the [sic] end customer is the member for whom they seek both solid 
investment returns and better healthcare value.” Phrama Futures website, Objectives, available at 
http://www.pharmafutures.org/beta/about/objectives.asp. See also Sophia Tickell, Pharma 
Futures: Investor Analysis of the Future of the Pharmaceutical Sector, in RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT 273 (Rory Sullivan and Craig Mackensie, eds., 2006) 
98 CERES, Press Release, $1 trillion of investors call on SEC to require corporate disclosure on 
financial risks of climate change, June 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.ceres.org/news/news_item.php?nid=197. Additional signatories included SRI funds, 
churches, and union pension funds. Id. 
99 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
100 Investor Network on Climate Risk website, 10-Point Investor Action Plan, available at 
http://www.incr.com/index.php?page=20 
101 CalPERS website, Environmental Investments Initiative,  available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/environ-invest/home.xml 
102 CalPERS, Agenda Item 7B, February 20, 2007, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/about/board-cal-agenda/agendas/invest/200702/item07b-00.pdf. CalPERS has three 
emerging market investment managers. For the time period April 1, 2002, to December 31, 2006, 
two of the three managers had lower returns on the CalPERS’ restricted portfolio than those 
managers did for other clients without those restrictions. Id. at 2-3.  
103 See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (providing a brief description of the Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative). 
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regulatory goal of improving sustainable economic development at all 
corporations. 104 
Overall, there seem to be only a limited number of pension funds actively 
involved in LTRI issues. In addition, these and other funds that purport to be 
working towards sustainable development may be taking other actions in their 
investment practices that actually work against it.105 The next sections discuss the 
LTRI activities of those pension funds beyond the New York, California, and 
Connecticut funds described above, and also discuss those activities by pension 
funds that may actually work against LTRI. 
3.1 Overview of Public Pension 
To understand how public pensions function, it is useful to conduct a brief 
review of their governance and investment decision-making process.  Public 
pensions are governed by a board of trustees. Board members typically fall into 
one of three categories based on how they were selected to serve on the board: 
trustees elected by plan members, ex officio trustees (e.g., state treasurer or city 
comptroller), and trustees appointed by a government official or committee. The 
average board has 36% elected trustees, 15% ex officio trustees, and 44% 
appointed trustees.106 However, there is wide variation in practice. For example, 
28% of public pension boards in one study did not have any member-elected 
trustees, while 32% had a majority of elected trustees.107 CalPERS, for example, 
has 6 elected trustees, 4 ex officio trustees, and 3 appointed trustees.108 The 
CalPERS board has responsibility for the funds’ investments, but that is not the 
case for all pension plans. The Florida Retirement System, for example, has its 
assets managed by the State Board of Administration (SBA). The SBA’s board 
consists of the Governor, the Attorney General, and the State Chief Financial 
Officer.109 Likewise, in Connecticut, the various public retirement plans have 
their assets invested by the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, which 
has the State Treasurer as the sole trustee.110 In both Florida and Connecticut there 
                                                 
104 See infra notes 120-27. 
105 See infra Part III.2.3. 
106 David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on 
the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 195 (2005) 
107 Id.  at 221. 
108 Id. at 195. 
109 The Chief Financial Officer is an elected position that takes on the roles of the state treasurer 
and state comptroller. Florida Department of Financial Services Website, Chief Financial Officers 
of the State of Florida, available at www.fldfs.com/Treasurer/Bio/CFO_FLDFS.asp 
110 Denise Nappier, Investment Policy Statement for the State of Connecticut Retirement Plans & 
Trust Funds Investment Policy 4-5 (2002). 
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is an Investment Advisory Council that may comment on investment policy or 
selection of investment services providers.111   
The board of the pension plan or the investment board determines the 
investment policy (e.g., levels of acceptable risk) and the asset allocations of the 
plan’s assets. Typically, the Executive Director or Chief Investment Officer, as 
well as an investment consultant, will assist the board in these decisions. After 
these decisions are made, the pension fund will hire (and then continually 
monitor) a combination of internal (pension fund staff) and external investment 
managers to make the actual investments. 
3.2 LTRI and the Majority of Public Pension Funds 
To get a better understanding of what public pensions are doing with 
respect to LTRI, I conducted a survey of public pension trustees in the fall of 
2006. A total of 64 trustees responded to the survey representing 58 different 
pension systems from 22 different states. These 58 pension funds controlled over 
$560 billion in assets. They ranged in size from those controlling approximately 
$20 million to several controlling over $20 billion (the average fund controlled 
$9.6 billion and the median fund controlled approximately $1.5 billion). In the 
discussion below, reference to “large” funds means those funds with over $1 
billion in assets, and “small” funds are those with under $1 billion. The use of 
external money managers was common, as 67% of the funds had 100% of their 
assets managed externally and 79% had over 80% of their assets managed 
externally. Other information reported below is based on my review the 2005-
2006 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR)112 and websites of the 33 
public pension funds with over $20 billion in assets in September 2005.   
3.2.1 Proxy Voting 
The minimum level of activity for a pension fund to be a responsible 
owner is to vote its proxies in an informed manner on social and environmental 
shareholder proposals. The first step in this process is the development of proxy 
voting guidelines for use by internal and external money managers. The 
development of guidelines by pension plans, or at least the awareness of these 
policies by trustees,113 is limited. Only 29% of respondents indicated that they 
                                                 
111 In Connecticut, the investment advisory board has 2 ex officio members, 5 appointed members, 
and 5 union elected members. State of Connecticut, Investment Advisory Council, available at 
http://www.state.ct.us/ott/IACbrochure.pdf. In Florida, the Investment Advisory Council is 
appointed by the board. SBA website, available at http://www.sbafla.com/about_iac.aspx. 
112 For a description of CAFRs, see infra 179-80. 
113 This survey question asked trustees if the pension had guidelines on the four different issues 
listed above. They were not provided with the option of selecting “don’t know” for this question. 
Thus, it is possible that a pension plan has voting guidelines on these matters but the responding 
trustee was not aware of them.  
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were aware of a policy on corporate governance issues (39% of large funds and 
only 20% of small funds), 10% on environmental issues (14% of large; 7% of 
small funds), and 17% on other social issues (29% of large; 7% of small funds).  
When asked if external managers were provided with clear guidance on how to 
vote proxies, 53% of respondents responded affirmatively, 35% said “no,” and the 
remaining 12% of funds did not know. Some funds abstain from getting involved 
in proxy voting at all. For example, one respondent stated that the board has 
“external managers vote the proxies as they see fit” and another that “we always 
vote with management.” These results are consistent with a recent survey finding 
that 73% Canadian investment managers “exercised discretion over 85% or more 
of pension plan client proxies.”114 
Many commentators point to the influence of Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) and other proxy advisory firms in determining the success of a 
shareholder proposal.115 Some criticize this influence because ISS is an 
organization without accountability to the pension beneficiaries.116 In this sample, 
26% (33% of large funds) indicated they relied on external advice or guidelines 
for voting proxies.117 Approximately half of those indicating that they use an 
external advisor indicated that they relied, at least in part, on guidelines from ISS. 
A review of the largest pension funds’ publicly available information 
provides additional information. Although many pensions (approximately half of 
the websites I reviewed) do not provide any information on their proxy voting 
guidelines online, others not only posted guidelines that covered social issues in 
some detail, but also have their actual votes at each corporation available to the 
public online (e.g., CalPERS, CalSTRS, Ohio Public Employees, Wisconsin 
Investment Board). Some pension funds have detailed voting policies on 
corporate governance issues, but are virtually silent with respect to social issues. 
Others, such as the Colorado Employees Retirement System, have a detailed 
policy on corporate governance issues, but have a blanket policy of abstaining on 
all social issues.118 
                                                 
114 CANADIAN SHAREHOLDER ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, 2006 KEY PROXY 
VOTE SURVEY 10 & 48 (2007), available at www.share.ca. 
115 Hawley & Williams, Fiduciary Capitalism, supra note 22, at 31. 
116 Id. 
117 9% of respondents indicated that they did not know. 
118 Colorado PERA Voting Proxy Policy 7 (2006), available at 
www.copera.org/pdf/Policy/proxy_voting.pdf (“PERA with Abstain on all social issues, and will 
only vote on financial issues.”)  In relation to the discussion in Part II with respect to sustainability 
reporting, it is interesting to note that several of these funds’ proxy guidelines support proposals 
requiring corporations to provide disclosure on environmental issues. See, e.g., OHIO PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY STATEMENT AND 
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Overall, there is a wide range of practice in the voting of proxies. 
However, based on my survey results and review of proxy voting guidelines, it 
seems that most pensions do not take an active role in voting on shareholder 
proposals on social and environmental issues. 
3.2.2 Socially Responsible Investing 
The survey also asked pension trustees about “socially responsible 
investment” practices. This, however, was probably a poor choice of wording 
given its negative connotation amongst some.119 Technically, SRI is a widely used 
practice, as 28% of pensions indicated having some type of investment restriction 
(negative screen). The most common restrictions were those on investments in 
“terrorist” nations,120 Sudan,121 tobacco,122 and the McBride Principles (on ending 
religious discrimination in Northern Ireland).123  These restrictions are typically 
                                                                                                                                     
GUIDELINES 14 (2004) (“OPERS supports proposals asking for environmental reporting, provided 
the proposals do not require the disclosure of proprietary information or cause an undue financial 
burden on the company.”);  STATE OF WISCONSIN INVESTMENT BOARD, DOMESTIC PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES 23 (2006) (stating that “SWIB will support increased reporting if: (1) a company’s 
product or service has the potential to affect the environment adversely; (2) the company has been 
the subject of adverse publicity or litigation because of its environmental policies; and (3) the 
company has failed to provide adequate information, as determined by SWIB staff, about its 
environmental practices to shareholders.”). Others have policies against additional environmental 
reporting. See OHIO STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM, STOCK PROXY VOTING POLICY 6 
(2006) (“STRS will vote against resolutions requiring a report on environmental issues provided 
the company complies with all laws regarding environmental reporting.”) 
119 See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Institutional Shareholder Services, 2006 
Investor Study, supra note 7, at 58. 
120 As an example from a pension fund that was not included in the survey, see VERMONT PENSION 
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, VPIC POLICY ON INVESTMENTS IN TERRORIST OR GENOCIDE LINKED 
COUNTRIES (November 29, 2006), available at 
www.vermonttreasurer.gov/documents/retireVPIC/policy/3-006_TerroristGenocidePolicy.pdf 
(adopting a an investment policy that seeks “to avoid investments in companies operating in a 
country engaged in the sponsorship of terrorism or genocide as identified by the U.S. State 
Department”). 
121 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign 
Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 274-75 (2006) (citing states that have laws that either require or 
permit public pensions and state investment boards to divest from companies doing business in 
Sudan). 
122 See Elizabeth Wine, CalPERS to Sell Tobacco Holdings, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at 27 
(reporting that CalPERS’s board voted to divest its $525 million holdings in tobacco investments); 
MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF INVESTMENT, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 49 (2006) (stating that in 1998 
the investment board voted to divest holdings in any company that obtains more than 15% of its 
revenue from consumer tobacco products). 
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due to state legislative action. For example, Florida state law has requirements 
based on the McBride Principles and prohibitions on investments in companies 
that do business with Cuba.124 Others are more specific, such as a police and fire 
pension fund stating that it would not investment in companies that promote 
violence against police in music or video games. When asked specifically about 
an SRI policy, 10% of funds indicated that they had a policy on SRI. However, 
for at least two of those respondents, that policy was a prohibition against it. 
 Overall, pension funds are not active in social investing. Although reports 
on social investing by the Social Investing Forum, for example, claim that public 
pensions are actively involved in SRI,125 that does not appear to be the case on a 
widespread basis or beyond negative screening restrictions imposed by state law 
on a limited set of issues. In fact, some argue that use of social investing in 
general—which the Social Investment Forum places at almost one out of every 
ten dollars under professional management126—is significantly overstated.127 . In 
addition, it is important to note that these issues that are the basis of existing SRI 
do little to promote sustainable economic development amongst a large number of 
corporations. 
3.2.3 Impact on Asset Managers 
Through their asset managers, public pensions may be furthering the 
problem of short-termism. Currently, the US lags behind the rest of the world in 
incorporating extra-financial information into investment decisions.128 A recent 
survey of investment managers—including some of the largest managers for US 
pension funds—found that only 11 percent of respondents believed that 
                                                                                                                                     
123 For a discussion of the history of the MacBride Principles and their adoption by public pension 
funds, see Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What 
Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 167, 178-
198 (1999). 
124 FLA. STAT. CH 121.153 (2001) (“the Board of Administration shall invest the assets of the 
System Trust Fund in such a manner that the investments in institutions doing business in or with 
Northern Ireland shall reflect the advances made by such institutions in eliminating 
discrimination”); FLA. STAT. CH 121.153 (2001) (prohibiting investments in companies doing 
business in or with Cuba). 
125 SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (2006), available at 
www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sri_trends_report_2005.pdf. 
126 Social Investment Forum, supra note 125, at iv.  
127 See Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden, Social Investing: Pension Plans Should Just Say 
“No,” in PENSION FUND POLITICS: THE DANGERS OF SOCIAL INVESTING 13, 14-19 (Jon Entine, 
ed., 2005) 
128 Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 296. 
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mainstream practice would include the integration of social and environmental 
factors into corporate performance indicators within the next 5 years.129 By 
contrast, for European, Canadian, and Australian respondents, the affirmative 
response rate was between 60% and 90%.130 A follow up survey also found US 
investment managers to be lower than the global average in believing that climate 
change, environmental management, human rights, and sustainability, are 
currently material or will be material within the next five years.131 Going forward, 
only one-third of US investment managers expect to see an increase in client 
demand for the integration of ESG issues into investment practices in the next 
three years and only one-fifth expect to see clients demand new products based on 
ESG analysis.132  
Public pension funds seem to be doing little to change these expectations 
of investment managers. Pension funds influence external investment managers’ 
engagement on ESG issues with companies through the managers’ selection, their 
initial contract, their compensation structure, and through regular review 
meetings.133 The current message through these four channels is that managers 
will be rewarded for meeting specific benchmarks or beating their competition.134 
Krehmeyer and colleagues note the problem of pension funds evaluating their 
asset managers on a quarterly basis, which continues the short-termism cycle.135 
In my survey, 70% of the funds review external managers’ performance quarterly 
(19% do annual reviews). This, of course, does not mean that a manager is at risk 
of being fired for one or two quarters of poor performance, but being evaluated 
and possibly compensated based on quarterly performance clearly has the 
potential to focus managers only on short-term investment performance related to 
the relevant benchmark. 136 In addition, such a process makes it highly unlikely 
                                                 
129 MERCER INVESTMENT CONSULTING, 2005 FEARLESS FORECAST: A CONSENSUS FORECAST OF 
US AND GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND INDUSTRY TRENDS 5 (2005). 
130 Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 296. 
131 MERCER INVESTMENT CONSULTING, 2006 FEARLESS FORECAST: WHAT DO INVESTMENT 
MANAGERS THINK ABOUT RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT? 5-6 (2006).  
132 Id. at 7-8. 
133 Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 296 & 298. 
134 See id. at 307. 
135 Krehmeyer et al., supra note 14, at 14 
136 PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A REVIEW 53 (2001), 
available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/securities_and_investments/fin_sec_mynfinal.cfm. 
(noting that quarterly reviews in combination with the lack of clear timeframes have the “potential 
to encourage managers to adopt an investment approach which does not reflect either their clients’ 
wishes or their long-term interests”). An ethnographic study of private and public pension funds 
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for the managers to focus on the long-term,137 which is necessary for adopting 
new investment approaches based on environmental and social issues.138 Without 
a clear message from pension trustees that consideration of LTRI issues is not 
simply a “fad” and that money managers will not be punished for a short-term 
performance short-fall due to the integration of LTRI information into their 
investment decisions, investment managers will not devote significant resources 
to these practices.139  
3.3 Pension Fund Trustees and LTRI: The Hurdles 
The survey also asked the trustees to indicate which factors influenced 
their fund’s decision not to engage in SRI. The most common response was that 
the trustees believed it was not appropriate for them to make investment decisions 
for the fund based on ethical issues (45% selected this factor). This reflects the 
association of SRI with ethical investors and not the ESG, LTRI, or extra-
financial criteria investment movement.140 It also reflects a concern by trustees 
that consideration of such factors is a breach of fiduciary duties. In fact, two 
trustees provided a write-in response specifically indicating that concern. The first 
subsection below addresses those issues. 
 As for additional factors influencing the decision not to engage in SRI, 
trustees indicated that they believed SRI would reduce returns (36%), they were 
not under pressure from the plan membership to develop SRI policies  (33%), 
they lacked of knowledge (22%141), or it was viewed as too expensive (15%). 
Only two trustees indicated that they did not have an SRI policy because they 
thought the plan membership would be against it. Among the open-ended 
responses provided by the trustees, one mentioned “fear of change” by the board. 
Although only one trustee thought to mention this fear, this concern is reflected in 
trustees’ beliefs about the impact of social investing on returns and their general 
                                                                                                                                     
finds evidence of the challenge of thinking long-term with respect to asset managers (both internal 
and external) when trustees are barraged with short-term information. WILLIAM M. O’BARR AND 
JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE & FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 
168-72 (1992). For example, one interviewee described the process of reviewing asset managers’ 
monthly performance reports but also stating that at their pension fund they “don’t try to fire 
managers over short periods of time.” Id at 169. The authors noted the use of the word “try” and 
wondered how often the interviewee’s pension fund was successful in resisting a focus on the 
short-term. Id. Overall, O’Barr and Conley conclude that “to focus seriously on the long term is an 
act of intellectual originality that goes against the cultural grain.” Id. at 168. 
137 Krehmeyer et al., supra note 14, at 9. 
138 See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text. 
139 Guyatt, supra note 18, at 143-45. 
140 See supra notes 45 & 87 and accompanying text. 
141 Only one large pension fund indicated lack of knowledge as factor. 
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knowledge of these practices. These concerns are addressed in the subsection 
below on conservative decision making by trustees.  
3.3.1 Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
Trustees may decline to incorporate sustainability factors into their 
investment practices due to a belief that it would be a breach of their fiduciary 
duties. The state laws establishing each pension fund typically also state the 
fiduciary duties of the trustees, which can be categorized as the duties of loyalty 
and prudence. These duties also exist as common law duties as set forth in the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts. With respect to the duty of prudence, state statutes 
will establish either a prudent person standard (requiring trustees to consider each 
investment in isolation) or a prudent investor standard (requiring trustees to 
consider each investment as part of an investment portfolio).142 The trend is 
towards adopting the prudent investor standard,143 as seen by forty-three states 
having adopted some variation of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA).144 
Included within the duty of prudence is the duty of care, which requires trustees to 
“to exercise reasonable effort and diligence in making and monitoring 
investments for the trust.”145 The duty of loyalty requires that the trustees 
“administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”146  
Some state statutes modify or seek to clarify the content of these duties 
through additional provisions. For example, in Nebraska, the law on the duties of 
the Investment Council states that “No assets of the retirement systems  . . .  shall 
be invested or reinvested if the sole or primary investment objective is for 
economic development or social purposes or objectives.”147 By contrast, 
                                                 
142 CAROL V. CALHOUN ET AL., GOVERNMENTAL PLANS ANSWER BOOK § 7.10 -7.13 (2d ed. 2007). 
Some states blend the two standards together. Id.  
143 Id. at § 7.13 
144 FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 103 
(2005), available online at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_20051123.pdf; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (establishing a prudent investment standard). 
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment d (1992). 
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); see also UNIFORM 
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 (“A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the 
interest of the beneficiaries”). 
147 NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1239.01(3) (2003); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4921(3) (1993) (“No 
moneys in the fund shall be invested or reinvested if the sole or primary investment objective is 
for economic development or social purposes or objectives”). Calhoun et al. argue that the Kansas 
statute is unclear on whether it prohibits consideration of social issues in all instances, or only 
when it is expected to have a negative impact on the investment’s return. Calhoun et al., supra 
note 142, at §  7-31. 
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Connecticut state law provides that the State Treasurer “may” consider “the 
social, economic and environmental implications of investments of trust funds in 
particular securities.”148 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts discusses social investing in its 
commentaries, but it does not provide a clear statement on its appropriateness 
under a trustees’ fiduciary duties.149 These comments, however, rely primarily on 
academic articles discussing trustees’ fiduciary duties in the context of social 
investing based on negative screens—with most of these articles relating to 
institutional investors divesting from corporations conducting business in 
apartheid South Africa in the 1980s.150 As discussed above, social investing may 
be based either on ethical values or as a strategy to increase value through 
decreased risk and higher return.151 Although social investing based on ethical 
values and the use of negative screening is also likely not a violation of fiduciary 
duties,152 an investment strategy based on utilizing environmental and social 
factors to increase value is clearly not a violation of a trustee’s fiduciary duties.153 
In fact, a recent survey of the law by the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
argues that it would be a violation of fiduciary duties not to consider such issues 
in certain situations.154  
                                                 
148 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13d (2002). 
149 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 general notes comment c (1992) 
150  See id. (citing such work as Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of 
'South African' Securities, 65 NEB. L. REV. 209 (1986); Jerry and Joy, Social Investing and the 
Lessons of South Africa Divestment: Rethinking the Limitations on Fiduciary Discretion, 66 OR. 
L. REV. 685 (1987); Troyer et al., Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications 
for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEORGETOWN L. J. 127 
(1985)).  
151 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text. 
153 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 102-116 (reviewing the consideration of 
ESG issues in investment decision making under ERISA, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and 
the UPIA); Calhoun et al., supra note 142, at §7-31 (“No one questions the right of a pension fund 
to avoid investment in tobacco stocks based on the trustees’ reasonable belief that the risks 
associated with tobacco stocks, in relationship to their returns, make them a poor investment”). 
154 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 11-14. The United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative’s Asset Management Working Group commissioned the Freshfields 
Report. Id. at 6. This report reviews fiduciary duty requirements in nine different countries. Id. at 
6. The objective of the study was to answer the following question: “Is the integration of 
environmental, social and governance issues into investment policy (including asset allocation, 
portfolio construction and stock-picking or bond-picking) voluntarily permitted, legally required 
or hampered by law and regulation; primarily as regards public and private pension funds, 
secondarily as regards insurance company reserves and mutual funds?” Id. 
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Social investing may potentially violate the duty of loyalty if investment 
returns are sacrificed for the primary purpose of providing benefits (social or 
financial) to a third party,155 or the trustees are using the plan’s assets to further 
their own political agenda.156 Both statements need to explanation, however. First, 
the duty of loyalty is not violated when the purpose of social investing is long-
term value creation consistent with the duty of prudence, which is the case with 
LTRI.157 In this situation, the benefits accruing to the third parties are not the 
primary purpose of the investment decision, but are due to the recognition that the 
proper management of such social and environmental matters may decrease risk 
and increase value for the corporation (and the pension fund’s investment 
portfolio). Second, it is permissible to consider collateral social benefits when the 
costs are minimal. In one of the few cases considering social investing by public 
pension funds, the court in Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement 
System of Baltimore v. Mayor of Baltimore 158 held that a city ordinance 
preventing the city pension funds from investing in companies doing business 
with apartheid South Africa would not cause the trustees to violate their fiduciary 
duty of loyalty. This ruling was based, in part, on the finding that the costs of such 
a strategy were de minimis.159  Third, trustees may act upon “fundamental and 
generally accepted ethical principles”—which is distinct from a trustee’s personal 
social and political beliefs—and not be in violation of the duty of loyalty or the 
duty of prudence,160 which is discussed next.  
In Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore, the court also found that 
the city ordinance did not alter the trustees’ duty of prudence.161 In making this 
ruling, the court relied on the treatise Scott on Trusts.162 The court cited Scott for 
                                                 
155 UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 comments (“No form of so-called "social investing" is 
consistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust 
beneficiaries - for example, by accepting below-market returns - in favor of the interests of the 
persons supposedly benefited by pursuing the particular social cause”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 reporter’s notes comment f (citing with approval the above quote from 
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act).   
156  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment c (“in managing the investments of a trust, 
the trustee's decisions ordinarily must not be motivated by a purpose of advancing or expressing 
the trustee's personal views concerning social or political issues or causes”). 
157 See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
158   562 A.2d 720 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1990). 
159 Id. at 738. 
160 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 227.17 (4th ed. 2001). Scott goes on to state that trustees “may consider 
such matters as pollution, race discrimination, fair employment, and consumer responsibility.” Id. 
161 Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore, 562 A.2d at 735-38.  
162 Id. at 737. 
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the proposition that it is reasonable for a trustee to believe that a more socially 
responsible corporation will perform better over the long-run.163 In addition, the 
court also cited Scott for the idea that regardless of the impact of social 
performance on financial performance, “the investor, though a trustee of funds for 
others, is entitled to consider the welfare of the community, and refrain from 
allowing the use of funds in a manner detrimental to society.”164 This holding was 
qualified, however, in that it must also only involve de minimis costs,165 which is 
not a factor mentioned in Scott.166  
These statements are also consistent with the Uniform Management of 
Public Employee Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) and private pension 
trustees’ fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA). Both UMPERSA and the Department of Labor state that the 
consideration of collateral benefits through socially responsible investing is 
consistent with a trustee’s fiduciary duties if the investment has an expected rate 
of return commensurate to alternative investments of similar risk.167  
Overall, it is clear that the practice of long-term responsible investing with 
a goal of sustainable economic development would not be in violation of a 
trustee’s fiduciary duties. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer summarize their review 
of US law by stating that “there appears to be a consensus that, so long as ESG 
considerations are assessed within the context of a prudent investment plan, ESG 
considerations can (and, where they affect estimates of value, risk and return, 
should) form part of the investment decision-making process.”168 The report goes 
on to form prescriptive guidelines and permissive guidelines. Under prescriptive 
guidelines, the report states that the duty of prudence requires trustees to treat 
their proxies as assets and vote on shareholder resolutions in an informed 
                                                 
163 Id.  
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 In the 2001 edition of Scott on Trusts, the treatise does not mention the de minimis cost factor. 
See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 227.17 (4th ed. 2001). 
167 UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ACT §  8(a)(5) (“a 
trustee with authority to invest and manage assets . . . may consider benefits created by an 
investment in addition to investment return only if the trustee determines that the investment 
providing these collateral benefits would be prudent even without the collateral benefits”);  
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 110 (citing a Letter from the Department of 
Labor to William M. Tartikoff, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Calvert Group Ltd. 
(May 28, 1998)). This interpretation of ERISA fiduciary duties is consistent with the Department 
of Labor’s statements related to Economically Targeted Investments (ETIs). See infra notes 226-
28. 
168 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 114. 
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manner,169 and to consider the relevance of ESG considerations for investment 
decisions.170 Under permissive guidelines, the report states that it is not a violation 
of they duty of loyalty to engage in shareholder activism on ESG issues with the 
purpose of enhancing company value, or to consider the social and environmental 
benefits of an investment if the expected rate of return is commensurate to similar 
investments.171 The permissiveness of such actions is consistent with the 
Department of Labor’s statement that private pensions should engage in 
shareholder activism when it is expected to increase investment value.172  
3.3.2 Conservative Decision Making 
Even if trustees are assured that LTRI would not be in violation of their 
duties, most pension funds are still unlikely to engage in LTRI due to the trustees’ 
conservative investment decision making practices. Trustees are likely to follow 
the practices “commonly accepted throughout the investment management 
industry,”173 the advice of consultants, and the actions of their peer group.174 For 
example, in the UK, 63 percent of pension fund trustees indicated that in making 
investment decisions their fund “sticks as closely as possible to the accepted 
practice in the industry.”175   
                                                 
169 See also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(1) (1994) (stating with respect to private pensions that “The fiduciary 
obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible 
fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan's investment”). 
170 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 114. 
171 Id. at 115. 
172 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
C.F.R.§ 2509.94-2(3) (1994). 
An investment policy that contemplates activities intended to monitor or 
influence the management of corporations in which the plan owns stock is 
consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA where the responsible 
fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring 
or communication with management, by the plan alone or together with other 
shareholders, is likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment in the 
corporation, after taking into account the costs involved. Id. 
The issues the Department of Labor lists as possible candidates for shareholder activism include 
“the nature of long-term business plans, the corporation's investment in training to develop its 
work force, other workplace practices and financial and non-financial measures of corporate 
performance.” Id. This interpretive bulletin is also cited by the Myners Report in support of 
greater shareholder activism by pension plans in the United Kingdom. Myners, supra note 136, at 
92-93. 
173 GORDON CLARK, PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 157 (2000) 
174 Myners, supra note 136, at 59-61. 
175 Id. at 59. 
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Although there is some leadership in LTRI practices,176 it is far from the 
commonly accepted practices necessary to change trustee behavior on a large 
scale. To engage in sustainable investing, trustees will be forced out of their 
comfort zone. For example, they will need to consider managers using new 
strategies to incorporate non-financial data into investment analysis. These 
managers will not have a long track record with these strategies to demonstrate 
their effectiveness, which will make trustees question the appropriateness of such 
investments.177 Likewise, trustees and investment consultants will need to develop 
new and perhaps untested performance measures to evaluate these managers.178 
This will also pull trustees back towards conventional strategies and push them 
away from sustainable investing.  
4 Public Pension Disclosure of LTRI Investment Policy and 
Implementation 
In light of the potential for public pensions to serve a useful role under a 
new governance approach to regulation and considering the currently limited 
involvement of these funds, public pensions in the US should be required to 
disclose whether or not LTRI considerations play a role in their investment 
policies. In addition, pension funds should provide disclosure on the actual 
implementation of those policies, such as their engagement with corporations, 
their proxy voting policies, and the basis of their selection and retention of asset 
managers that utilize an LTRI strategy. The most likely avenue for this reform 
would be through modification to the Government Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) Statement No. 25, Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit Pension 
Plans and Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans. GASB statement No. 
25 is the basis for the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) filed by 
most public pensions.179 Included within the CAFR is an investment section 
where the pension plan reports on its investment policies, asset allocations, 
investment activities, and fees.180 
 Alternatively, the proposal could be implemented through amendments to 
the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act 
(UMPERSA), which currently requires pension plans to disclose an annual report 
                                                 
176 See supra notes _88-104 and accompanying text.  
177 See Clark, supra note 173, at 140 (discussing unconventional investment decisions by trustees 
in general). 
178 See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 
179 Calhoun et al., supra note 142, at § 5.5-5.6.  
180 Id. at § 5.8. 
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to the public.181 Amendments to UMPERSA would have significantly less impact 
than amendment to GASB Statement No. 15, however, as it would require each 
state to amend their laws and UMPERSA has apparently not had a significant 
influence on state laws.182 As a third alternative, disclosure of LTRI investment 
policies and implementation actions could be encouraged as a “best practice” by 
influential organizations such as the Government Finance Officers Association.183 
The remainder of this section reviews the developments surrounding a similar law 
adopted in the UK and then the expected impact in the US. 
4.1 UK Pensions of Act of 1995 Disclosure Requirements 
Starting in 2000, pension funds (both public and private) in the UK are 
required by law to disclose in their Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) “the 
extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken 
into account in the selection, retention and realisation of investments” and “their 
policy (if any) in relation to the exercise of the rights (including voting rights) 
attaching to investments.” 184 Note that the law does not require pensions to 
consider social and environmental issues, but only that the pension provides 
disclosure on whether or not they do. Similar laws for pension funds exist in 
Belgium,185 Germany,186 and Sweden.187 
The SIP disclosure requirements amendment to the Pensions Act of 
1995—along with the recommendations in the well-publicized Myners Report in 
2001 that encouraged trustees to be more active owners188—has had a significant 
impact on LTRI shareholder engagement in the UK. A review of actions taken by 
pensions during the first year of the requirement found that 59% of pensions 
stated that they were incorporating social and environmental issues into their 
investments, and 48% indicated that they directed their fund managers to take 
                                                 
181 UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS Act § 13. Full text of 
UMPERS is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#mpersa. 
182 Calhoun et al., supra note 142, at § 7-22 (noting partial adoptions of UMPERS in only South 
Carolina and Colorado). 
183 See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 226-227 (2001) [hereinafter 
Romano, Less is More]. 
184 The Occupational Pension Schemes Amendment Regulations 1999: Statutory Instrument 1999 
No. 1849, available at www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/19991849.htm. 
185 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, supra note 144, at 152. 
186  Id. at 63 
187 Id. at 152. 
188 See Myners, supra note 136, at 14. 
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these issues into account.189 Fourteen percent of the funds (mostly smaller funds) 
indicated that they would not take these issues into account, and one-quarter left 
the decision to their fund managers.190 The SIP statements, however, rarely 
mentioned how the policy would be implemented in practice and used language 
that made it difficult to determine how investment practices would actually 
change, if at all.191  
In the following years, the disclosure requirements continued to have a 
significant influence on behavior, but the extent of their actual impact on practices 
to-date remains somewhat unclear. For example, FairPensions, an NGO 
sponsored by Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and others,192 reviewed 
practices at the 20 largest pension funds in the UK in 2006 and found that only 12 
of the 20 actually disclosed whether or not they consider ESG issues in their 
SIPs.193 The study claimed that most pensions seemed to take a “box ticking” 
approach to ESG issues by making general statements in support of responsible 
investment but not doing anything to implement those statements.194  
Other investigations report a greater impact. Just Pensions, a program 
established by the UK Social Investment Forum,195 surveyed 79 pensions in fall 
2005.196 When asked which practices the funds used “a lot” for dealing with ESG 
issues, amongst the large funds—those with over £ 1 billion in assets197—4% 
used negative screening, 16% used positive screening, 58% used engagement, and 
50% the exercise of voting rights.198 For all pensions in the sample, almost one-
half indicated that they would use engagement and voting rights at least “a little 
                                                 
189   EUGENIE MATHIEU, RESPONSE OF UK PENSION FUNDS TO THE SRI DISCLOSURE REGULATION 
33 (2000), available at www.uksif.org/Z/Z/Z/lib/2000/10/reprt-pf-discl/index.shtml 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 35. 
192 FairPensions website, About Us, available at www.fairpensions.org.uk/about_us. 
193 FAIRPENSIONS, UK PENSION SCHEME TRANSPARENCY ON SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES i (2006), available at www.fairpensions.org.uk/news/disclosureranking.htm. 
194 Id. at iii.  
195 Just Pensions website, About Just Pensions, available at 
http://www.uksif.org/J/Z/Z/jp/about/main/index.shtml. 
196 CHRIS GRIBBEN & MATTHEW GITSHAM, WILL UK PENSION FUNDS BECOME MORE 
RESPONSIBLE?: A SURVEY OF TRUSTEES 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.uksif.org/J/Z/Z/lib/2006/files/02/jp-ukpf-will06/ukpf2006-justpens.pdf 
197 Id. at 7n.8. 
198 Id. at 11. For the smallest funds, they were more likely to use negative and positive screening 
and less likely to use engagement or voting rights. Id. Pensions for charities were the most likely 
to use any of these mechanisms. Id. 12. 
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more” in the next three years.199 One-third of pensions indicated that ESG issues 
had at least “some impact” on the selection of fund managers, and over one-
quarter of the sample used a formal process to incorporate ESG factors into the 
appointment and assessment of fund managers.200   
Overall, the SIP disclosures requirements appear have had a significant 
impact in the UK. For example, based on interviews with UK fund managers, 
Williams and Conley find that the disclosure requirement is having a “profound 
effect” amongst large pension funds.201 Others have drawn similar conclusions.202 
In addition, these requirements seem to have strong support amongst trustees. In 
fact, one-third of the sample in the Just Pensions 2005 survey “strongly agreed” 
and another one-third “agreed” that additional legislation is needed beyond simple 
disclosure of a policy and that funds should provide information on actual 
implementation.203 These developments have also apparently had an impact 
throughout the UK investment community. For example, 47% of UK investment 
managers expect a demand for investment products that utilize social and 
environmental factors in the next three years, compared to only 19% of US 
investment managers.204  There are other differences between the UK and the US, 
however, that likely explain a significant portion of these differences.205  
                                                 
199 Id. at 12. 
200 Id. at 15-16. None of the public pensions in this sample used those methods, though 10% used 
formal procedures in the selection of investment consultants. Id. at 15. The report does not provide 
information on the size of those public pension funds.  
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1000 pensions and only 79 responded. Id. at 5.  
204 Mercer, 2006 Fearless Forecast, supra note 131, at 8. 
205 For example, institutional investments assets in mutual funds are greater in the US (which may 
be more short-term focused) and the UK government has shown support for CSR issues. Williams 
and Conley, supra note 201, at 535-38. 
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4.2 LTRI Disclosure for Public Pension Funds: A Catalyst for Change 
As discussed in Part III, there does not appear to be wide-spread 
consideration of LTRI issues in public pension investment practices, and some 
actions may actual work to further the short-termism problem. This article’s 
proposed reforms would not require that public pensions integrate such 
considerations into their investment policies and practices, but should ensure that 
the decision whether or not to do so is a fully-informed decision, rather than pre-
empted by concerns over fiduciary duties or stalled due to conservative decision 
making. This disclosure requirement will establish the legitimacy of LTRI and 
allay concerns that such actions are in violation of fiduciary duties. This proposal 
will also raise general awareness of LTRI and allow trustees to observe and learn 
from the actions of others, which will reduce some of the causes of conservative 
decision making. Public pensions are free, or course, to state that they do not 
consider LTRI issues for any reason, such as cost or the belief that it is not in the 
beneficiaries’ best interest. Overall, though, we can expect public pensions to 
engage in more thoughtful consideration of their policies on shareholder proposals 
and proxy voting, shareholder engagement, and directly through their 
investments. 
Shareholder Proposals and Voting Policies: As shown earlier, few public 
pensions have well-developed policies on voting their proxies on environmental 
and social issues,206 and only a handful are active in sponsoring shareholder 
proposals.207 Although many pensions may (and should) decide to continue not to 
sponsor shareholder proposals due to the resources required, it is irresponsible of 
trustees not to have a complete proxy voting policy or to have a blanket policy of 
abstaining on voting on social and environmental issues. It is well established that 
proxies are assets of the pension plan and should be voted appropriately.208 There 
is an emerging consensus that issues of sustainability will have an impact on 
investment performance over the long-term209 and therefore prudent trustees must 
devote thought to their policies and provide justification for their decisions. In 
                                                 
206 See supra Part 3.2.1. 
207 See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
208 See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(1) (1994) (stating that “The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are 
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addition, contingent on cost constraints, pensions should make their votes 
available to the public.210  
Shareholder Engagement. Public pensions can choose to directly engage 
with corporations individually or act through a coalition of investors, such as the 
Carbon Disclosure Project211 or the Investor Network on Climate Risk.212 Such 
coalitions operate in different ways. The Carbon Disclosure Project, for example, 
involves a request filed by institutional investors to corporations to provide 
disclosure on greenhouse gas emissions and the risks of climate change to the 
corporation.213 This information is then available for pensions to use in any direct 
engagement with the corporation, for their investment managers to use in 
investment analysis or engagement, and for other interested stakeholders of the 
corporation. As a member of the Investor Network on Climate Risk, pension 
trustees can participate in coordinated corporate engagement with other 
institutional investors.214 Overall, collaboration allows pension funds to operate 
more efficiently by reducing duplicate costs, learning from others’ experience, 
and generally increasing their influence.215 Through these coalitions investors can 
also engage in the public policy process, such as the efforts of some public 
pensions to encourage the SEC to require corporations to provide greater 
disclosure on climate change risks.216 They can also engage in the policy process 
by monitoring the political activity of the corporations in which they invest.217 
Investment Practices. For those pension funds that decide to place an 
increased priority on LTRI issues, we would expect that this would have a 
significant impact throughout the financial industry because public pensions rely 
so heavily on investment consultants and external money managers. For example, 
if pension boards start pressing for action on LTRI practices, then investment 
consulting firms will start to evaluate money managers on the basis of 
                                                 
210 See infra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the role of disclosure to reduce the risks 
of politicalization of the process) 
211 Carbon Disclosure Project website, available at www.cdproject.net.  
212 See Investor Network on Climate Risk website, available at www.incr.com. 
213 See Carbon Disclosure Project, About Us, available at www.cdproject.net/aboutus.asp.  
214 Investor Network on Climate Risk, INCR Overview, available at 
http://www.incr.com/index.php?page=2.  
215 Hawley & Williams, Fiduciary Capitalism, supra note 22, at 173. 
216 See CERES press release, supra note 98 
217 See Hawley & Williams, Fiduciary Capitalism, supra note 22, at 174. In 2006, there were 29 
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engagement and integration of these issues.218  The consultants will seek 
investment managers that are trained on these issues and will work to develop 
compensation and evaluation practices that allow investment managers to 
undertake engagement based on long-term issues.219 As discussed earlier, pension 
funds can also influence external managers’ engagement practices through regular 
review meetings by raising these issues; to the extent these issues are not raised 
during review meetings, then external managers will provide little attention to 
them.220  
Through this process, we would expect best practices to develop and to be 
shared related to pension funds’ investment policies and implementation, as well 
as best practices amongst investment managers on how they demonstrate their 
effective consideration of LTRI issues and engagement practices to trustees and 
their consultants.221 These developments also have the potential to influence sell-
side analysts’ research. This is especially important considering that new financial 
analysts do not believe there is a demand for consideration of these issues, and 
therefore do not attempt to gain additional knowledge in this area.222 The primary 
                                                 
218 Thamotheram, supra note 9, at 300; see also MARATHON CLUB, LONG-TERM, LONG-ONLY 
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222 Tonello, supra note 14, at 45; UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, GENERATION LOST: YOUNG 
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES 4 (2005), available 
at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/ymt_summary_2005.pdf (reporting results from 
interviews with under-35 year-old financial analysts and finding that they were uninformed on 
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example in the area of analysts’ research is the Enhanced Analytics Initiative.223 
This is an initiative that seeks to improve the quality of sell-side analysts’ 
research on LTRI issues through financial incentives. Each member of the 
initiative, such as a pension fund, agrees to allocate at least five percent of their 
brokerage commissions to analysts conducting this type of research.224 The 
creation of new LTRI research and the pressure for greater corporate disclosure in 
general will not only improve the decision-making of public pensions’ asset 
managers, but will also further a new governance regulatory approach by creating 
information of use to others, including social investors, special interest groups, 
and government bodies. 
4.3 Preventing the Politicalization of Public Pensions’ Policies & Practices 
The primary argument against this proposal is that public pensions—
through the involvement of politicians or union representatives—will simply use 
LTRI as an excuse to take actions based on private political interests and without 
actual regard to long-term shareholder value.225 These arguments—raised most 
recently as an argument against granting shareholders access to the directors’ 
ballot—echo concerns over economically-targeted investments (ETIs) in the mid-
1990s. ETIs are investments by pension funds that take into account the 
investment’s economic and social benefits to the local community, such as 
increased employment or the provision of affordable housing.226 Some 
commentators argued that ETIs opened the door to “politicizing” pension 
investments, as opposed to “maximizing” them.227 Although some early studies 
showed that ETIs had a weakly significant negative impact on pension 
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performance, these studies used data before the mid-1990s when the Department 
of Labor issued a statement that ETIs were appropriate if the expected rate of 
return was comparable to alternative investments of a similar risk.228 More recent 
studies—including those using data after the Department of Labor’s 
announcement—have not found a negative relationship between the use of ETIs 
and fund performance.229 Thus, this provides some evidence that encouraging the 
use of LTRI, with a clear, stated focus on long-term shareholder value, will not 
simply lead to the politicizing of investments. 
In addition, the transparency required—on both policy and 
implementation—should also work against politicization or domination of 
decision-making by a special interest group. A pension’s LTRI disclosures 
provide an avenue for dialogue on the pension’s policies and performance from 
both plan members and third parties. Just as unions and special interest groups 
have started evaluating mutual funds and investment managers on their proxy 
voting records related to CEO compensation, labor issues, and the environment,230 
pensions’ practices will be scrutinized by both those seeking greater consideration 
of sustainability issues by pensions and those believing that such issues detract 
from the pension’s long-term performance goals. These analyses and discussions 
should help inform trustees, as well as push them to justify any actions taken (or 
decisions not to engage in LTRI) to plan members, sponsoring government 
bodies, and taxpayers.231 
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To further prevent politicization—and to improve trustee decision making 
in general—the governance of public pensions needs greater consideration. 232 
First, there should be greater disclosure of conflicts of interest policies,233 as 
political donations, for example, have the potential to inappropriately affect 
investment choices.234 Second, training and education of board members—
especially member-elected trustees—should become a priority. One trustee of a 
large fund in my survey stated that “Our board members have a three year term of 
office and the learning curve is at least two years.” 235 Surprisingly, only 14% of 
the trustees for large pension funds in my survey indicated that the plan had a 
formal, documented training program. This compared to 39% of smaller funds. 
Instead, the pension provided a budget for education and trustees obtained their 
own training on an informal basis. Common training programs attended by 
trustees included those offered through The Wharton School and Stanford Law 
School. The disclosure requirement proposed here would likely put LTRI issues 
on the curriculum of those programs—thus improving general knowledge of these 
issues—as well as spur research on sustainable development investing by the 
educators serving in those programs. 
 Finally, there should be greater consideration of the role of member-
elected trustees (including those serving on an Investment Advisory Council). 
There is some evidence that member-elected trustees can improve fund financial 
performance (as long as they do not dominate the board)236 and that they may 
reduce political interference, such as the sponsoring government using the 
pension assets as a “safety-valve” against other budget short-falls.237 Additional 
research in this area is needed, but such trustees may serve a useful monitoring 
role. However, there is also the concern that member-elected trustees could lead 
to the domination of the board by politically-motivated special-interest groups 
rather than creating a balanced board. For example, the US Chamber of 
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Commerce criticizes CalPERS for being dominated by union-elected member 
trustees and ex officio trustees that received union funding.238 
The capture of pension fund LTRI practices by politicians and special 
interest groups is also alleviated by the involvement of external money managers 
for most public pensions. To the extent that these managers are rewarded and 
evaluated on their shareholder engagement and the creation of long-term value, 
they will work with corporations to develop profitable sustainable development 
strategies, and not simply pressure corporations to improve their environmental 
and social performance without regard to the economic implications of those acts 
for the corporation.  
Capture is also alleviated if more pension funds are active this area, rather 
than just the current handful of active pensions.239 Greater involvement through 
institutional investor coalitions, the public posting of proxy voting guidelines and 
investment policies, and in other ways, contributes to the debate and adds new 
perspectives and balance. Currently, those setting the agenda for shareholder 
proposals, for example, are religious institutions.240 This does not necessarily 
mean that those proposals would not fit within LTRI as described in this article, 
but increased involvement by a diversity of pension funds will help ensure that 
the proposals receiving attention from corporations are consistent with LTRI. 
Finally, next steps to prevent such capture, as well as further new 
governance regulatory goals, would be greater participation of state and federal 
agencies in setting the agenda for shareholder engagement. A current example 
involves the UK’s Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) experiment with the 
Corporate Health and Safety Performance Index (CHaPSI).241 CHaPSI is an 
attempt to develop an index to measure firms’ performance and policies related to 
health and safety management. The HSE developed this index with the input from 
investors to help ensure that it is useful to them so they will be active in 
pressuring firms to improve their CHaPSI numbers. 242 Various agencies in the US 
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could experiment with developing similar programs. Consideration of how to 
improve the TRI along these lines is a natural starting point.243 Public pension 
involvement in these programs would grant legitimacy to this part of their LTRI 
policy, ensures the pensions are working towards regulatory goals, and, of course, 
helps provide more effective and efficient regulation. 
5 Conclusion 
Traditional legal mechanisms are limited in their ability to regulate 
corporations’ sustainable economic development. Under a new governance 
approach to regulation that seeks to harness the potential of informed and 
interested third-party actors to develop flexible and efficient regulation, public 
pensions can serve a useful role. These pensions have a natural interest in 
sustainable economic development, but there are hurdles in the way of their 
greater involvement. To motivate action, and then continually improve the quality 
of their involvement, public pensions should be required to disclose the extent to 
which they consider LTRI issues in their investment policies and practices. Public 
pensions are only one part of this broader, new governance regulatory approach, 
but they are a potentially powerful catalyst for change. Their actions can spur 
greater consideration of long-term responsible investor issues throughout the 
financial industry. In addition, their pressures for increased corporate disclosures 
on social and environmental issues as part of their LTRI practices will improve 
information-based regulatory approaches, such as the TRI and sustainability 
reporting. 
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